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JUDGES AS COSMOPOLITAN TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS
Paul Schiff Berman'
The topic of this panel refers specifically to the relationship between
international law and domestic constitutional law, but in my paper I would
like to expand the frame a bit. As Harold Hongju Koh's keynote lecture
for this symposium made clear,1 transnational legal process is not only
found in the dialogue among constitutional courts about constitutional
issues. It is also the more general idea that domestic judicial decisions
should take into account a broader interest in a smoothly functioning
international legal order and therefore, in the words of Justice Blackmun,
"reflect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill."2
According to this vision, judges owe their allegiance to an international
system of norms, not simply to their own domestic law.3 For example, the
Second Circuit recently ruled that a U.S. discovery statute "contemplates
international cooperation, and such cooperation presupposes an on-going
dialogue between the adjudicative bodies of the world community., 4 This
statement is distinctive, both because its focus on "adjudicative bodies of
the world community" seems to transcend individual territorial courts and
because it emphasizes dialogue among courts rather than mere deference.
f This is an edited transcript of a presentation delivered as part of International Law and
the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term: Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers Between
National, Foreign, and International Law?, a symposium held at the University of Tulsa
College of Law on October 29, 2004. Thanks to Marilee Corr and Allison Raggo for
research assistance.
1. Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, the 2004 Term: The
Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA COMP. & IN''L L. J. 1 (2004) (remarks in
this issue).
2. Soci6td Nat'l Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3. As then-Chief Judge Breyer has written, the appropriate inquiry for judges is how to
"help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross purposes."
Howe v. Goldcorp Inv. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991).
4. Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995).
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But beyond that one particular case, we must ask: how does the idea
that U.S. courts should be interested in a cooperative and smoothly
functioning international legal system actually play out in day-to-day
adjudication? And to answer that question, we must consider how courts
view their own domestic law in cases implicating multinational concerns,
how they view foreign law, and how they negotiate the differences
between foreign and domestic norms. Such transnational issues arise not
only when courts negotiate the relationship between international law and
U.S. constitutional law, but also in the interaction of foreign law and U.S.
domestic law in ordinary statutory or common law cases. Moreover, by
considering these broader relationships among legal norms within an
interlocking multinational system, we ask fundamental questions of law
and globalization.
6In Hoffinan-LaRoche v. Empagran, S.A., a case from this past term,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act7 would not apply
extraterritorially to regulate alleged anticompetitive activity that took
place overseas, at least to the extent that the relevant harm was suffered
only by foreign plaintiffs.8 Significantly, Justice Breyer, writing for the
Court, added this statement: "If America's antitrust policies could not win
their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress,
we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal
imperialism, through legislative fiat."9  In thinking about transnational
legal process, it might be useful to consider this idea of legal imperialism
and how to avoid the over-imposition of U.S. norms to transnational
disputes.
I will argue that the best way to avoid legal imperialism is for judges
to think of themselves as cosmopolitan transnational actors. In his paper
earlier in this symposium, Eric Posner cautioned that Koh's brand of
transnational legal process could result in the specter of cosmopolitan
activist judges striking down democratically enacted legislation.' ° But, at
least in the vision of cosmopolitanism I will outline today, we might just as
5. For further discussion of law and globalization, see Paul Schiff Berman, From
International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
(forthcoming 2005).
6. 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
7. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
8. Hoffnan-LaRoche, 124 S. Ct. at 2366-67.
9. Id. at 2369.
10. Eric Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term:




easily see cosmopolitanism leading to a kind of restraint; because a
cosmopolitan perspective might actually cause judges to refrain from
overly aggressive assertions of parochial norms. By considering the
importance of the international system and by thinking of how courts
should relate to each other and enforce each other's norms, judges might
act more cautiously and not reflexively apply their norms to every case
within their jurisdiction. From this perspective, Justice Breyer's
interpretation of the Sherman Act itself reflects such cosmopolitan
restraint. 11
In order to explore this idea of cosmopolitanism, I thought we might
look to the three mechanisms by which our legal system has traditionally
sought to avoid legal imperialism or legal parochialism in day-to-day
adjudication: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments. All
three of these inquiries implicate fundamental questions about how we can
have a legal system in a multi-state and multi-national world where lots of
people have different norms and where commercial activity, capital flows,
communications, and people cross borders much more frequently. How
do legal systems, which are traditionally territorially-based, deal with such
questions? This is a very large subject and today I will just briefly mention
three cases (one implicating jurisdiction, one choice of law, and one
judgment recognition) in order to see how they would play out from a
more cosmopolitan perspective.' 2
The jurisdiction case has already been discussed at great length earlier
in this conference. It is Rasul v. Bush,13 the Guantanamo detainees case.
Of course, we have thus far discussed the case in terms of habeas corpus,
but we can also think of it as a case involving the nature of legal
jurisdiction. At root level, the issue in Rasul is whether U.S. courts have
14jurisdiction over this off-shore regulatory haven. Such a question is
functionally equivalent to the one that arises when corporations attempt to
avoid local taxation or other regulatory regimes simply by relocating
beyond the territorial bounds of a jurisdiction. The only difference is that
here we have the U.S. Government operating off-shore and claiming that
the mere physical location of the detention facility deprives the U.S. courts
of jurisdiction.
11. Hoffman-LaRoche, 124 S. Ct. at 2369.
12. For a further discussion of cosmopolitanism as a framework for considering
jurisdictional questions, see Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 311, 314 (2002).
13. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
14. Id. at 2687.
2004]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
In the choice of law context, I turn to a recent Fourth Circuit case
involving a web site with the domain name www.barcelona.com."5 In that
case, Mr. Joan Nogueras Cobo ("Nogueras"), a Spanish citizen, registered
barcelona.com with the Virginia-based domain name registrar, Network
Solutions.16 Subsequently, Nogueras formed a corporation under U.S. law,
called Bcom, Inc.17 Despite the U.S. incorporation, however, the company
had no offices, employees, or even a telephone listing in the United
States." Nogueras (and the Bcom servers) remained in Spain. 9 The
Barcelona City Council asserted that Nogueras had no right to use
barcelona.com under Spanish trademark law and demanded that he
transfer the domain name registration to the City Council.0 The Fourth
Circuit, though, insisted on applying U.S. trademark law and ruled against
the City.21
Finally, with regard to recognition of judgments, consider Telnikoff v.
Matusevitch,2' a case decided a few years ago by the Maryland Supreme
Court. This was a libel action between two British citizens concerning
writings that appeared in a British newspaper. 23 After a complicated
sequence of proceedings in the United Kingdom, a jury ruled for the
plaintiff and ordered damages. However, Matusevitch moved to Maryland
and subsequently sought a declaratory order that the British libel
judgment could not be enforced in the United States, pursuant to the First
24Amendment. The Maryland Supreme Court ultimately ruled that,
because British libel law violates the speech-protective First Amendment
standards laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan5 and its progeny, the British judgment violated Maryland public
policy and could not be enforced. 26
15. Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th
Cir. 2003).




20. Id. at 621.
21. Id. at 630. For further discussion of this case, see Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a
Cosmopolitan Vision of Choice of Law: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era,
153 U. PA. L. REV. - (2005, forthcoming).
22. 702 A.2d 230 (1997).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 249.
[Vol. 12:1
TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS
Each of these three cases is complicated by the fact that we have
territorially based legal sovereigns addressing what is essentially non-
territorially based legal or personal activity. So, the question is: how
should courts address such cases?
One way of responding is what I would call "universalism." Now,
some people think of cosmopolitanism itself as a universalist vision, but I
want to distinguish the two concepts. A universalist approach would
emphasize that we are all members of a single "world community," and
universalists would therefore seek international harmonization as a way of
removing the "conflict" from the conflict-of-laws analysis. Although this
vision is attractive in its idealism, it strikes me as misguided for several
reasons. First, it asks that we see ourselves solely as citizens of the world
and therefore dissolves the multirootedness of community affiliation into
one global community. Second, it fails to capture the extreme emotional
ties people still feel to distinct transnational or local communities." Thus,
universalism tends to ignore the very attachments people hold most
deeply. Third, as Anupam Chander has pointed out, the aspiration that we
become solely citizens of the world is at least partly based on an
internationalization of John Rawls' theory of justice 2 and is therefore
subject to the same criticism Rawls has long faced: that his theory assumes
a Self detached from the social and cultural context that makes such a Self
possible. 29 Fourth, an ongoing system of universal governing norms poses
such a strong challenge to our current notions of nation-state sovereignty
that, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely to be adopted widely in the
foreseeable future. Fifth, and perhaps most important, in order to create a
set of universal legal norms, one needs to presuppose a world citizenry
devoid of both particularist ties and normative discussion about the
relative importance of such ties. Thus, universalism cuts off debate about
27. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in
Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 374 (1996) ("The powerful pull of loyalty exerted
by the imagined nation demonstrates that, even in the age of science, a loyalty system based
on romantic myths of shared history and kinship has a capacity to endure.").
28. See Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, 41 NOMOS XLI
12, 36 (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999) (noting that a number of philosophers
take a global version of Rawls' theory of justice as their starting point).
29. See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1005, 1047 (2001)
(criticizing cosmopolitanism because it embraces an image of the Self that "removes the
aspects that make the self special"). Chander ascribes this position to cosmopolitanism.
While I agree with his critique, I believe he is actually targeting what I call "universalism."
As this discussion makes clear, I view cosmopolitanism as the recognition of multiple
attachments, not the desire for a single world citizenry.
20041
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the nature of overlapping communities just as surely as territorialism or
parochialism does.
A cosmopolitan conception of conflicts of law, in contrast, makes no
attempt to deny the multirootedness of individuals within a variety of
communities, both territorial and non-territorial. Indeed, the basic tenet
of cosmopolitanism, as I define it, is the acknowledgment of multiple
communities, rather than the erasure of all communities except the most
encompassing. Thus, although a cosmopolitan conception of conflicts of
law often seeks to acknowledge and accommodate transnational and
international norms, it does not require a universalist belief in a single
world community.
In other articles, I have attempted to develop a cosmopolitan
approach to conflicts of laws that looks not solely to territorial connection,
but to community affiliation more generally.3" I do not have time here to
describe this approach in detail, but briefly, a cosmopolitan conception
would first consider the community affiliations of the parties and the
effects of various rules on the polities of the affected states. Second,
whereas most traditional choice-of-law regimes require a choice of one
national norm, a cosmopolitan approach permits judges to develop a
hybrid rule that may not correspond to any particular national regime.
Third, international treaties, agreements, or other statements of evolving
international or transnational norms may provide relevant guidance.
Fourth, courts could consider community affiliations that are not
associated with nation-states, such as industry standards, norms of
behavior promulgated by non-governmental organizations, community
custom, and rules associated with particular activities, such as internet
usage. Fifth, building on Justice Breyer's idea of legal parochialism, courts
could take into account traditional conflicts principles. For example,
choice-of-law regimes should not develop rules that encourage a
regulatory "race to the bottom" by making it easy to evade legal regimes.
These factors only begin to scratch the surface of what a cosmopolitan
approach might entail, but we can at least begin to glimpse some of the
contours of this approach by considering the cases I just described through
a cosmopolitan lens.
With regard to jurisdiction, jurisdictional rules (at least in the United
States) were traditionally grounded in the territorially-based power of a
sovereign. Thus, because a person physically present in a state literally
could be seized by state law enforcement officials, the courts of that state
30. See Berman, supra note 21; Berman, supra note 12.
[Vol. 12:1
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could legitimately subject the person to their jurisdiction." In the
twentieth century, territorially-based jurisdictional rules were loosened,
and as most of you know, the United States Supreme Court's primary
jurisdictional test now requires only that the defendant in a lawsuit have
sufficient contacts with the relevant state to satisfy a "traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice. 32 Nevertheless, this rule,
like its predecessor, maintains a territorial focus because it revolves around
"contacts" with a territory. Similarly, in the tax context, the overwhelming
majority of bilateral income tax agreements focus on whether a business
maintains a "permanent establishment" in a particular jurisdiction." Such
jurisdictional analysis enables regulatory evasion because entities can
physically locate outside of a jurisdiction without much effort and (at least
sometimes) escape oversight. This regulatory evasion is similar whether it
is an entity claiming that it is not in "X" state and therefore cannot be
subject to its jurisdiction, or a business saying it does not have a
"permanent establishment" in "Y" country and cannot be taxed there, or
the U.S. Government saying it is operating a detention facility in
Guantanamo outside the territorial borders of the United States and
therefore cannot be subject to federal court oversight. An exclusive focus
on territory makes such arguments possible. In contrast, a case such as
Rasuf 4 is an easy one if you look at community affiliation. Here, you have
a facility completely controlled by the U.S. Government, staffed by U.S.
military officers acting at the behest of U.S. governmental policy. To say
that it is somehow not affiliated with the United States and therefore not
subject to U.S. jurisdiction seems wrong from a cosmopolitanism point of
view.
With regard to choice of law, again the traditional conception in the
United States focused on territory. Thus, a cause of action was deemed to
accrue in some specific location, and the law of that location would be
applied.35 "Localizing" a transaction was often difficult, however, and
31. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (ruling that a State has power to
decide the "civil status and capacities of its inhabitants" and to regulate how property may
be handled, but that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory").
32. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
33. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, art. 7, § 1 (2003) (stating that an enterprise of one state doing
business in another shall not be taxed in the second state unless it has a permanent
establishment there).
34. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
35. See JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
2004]
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efforts to do so frequently involved seemingly arbitrary distinctions. In
response, a second wave of scholarship focused instead on what were
referred to as "governmental interests,"" but this framework turned out to
rest on a very parochial idea of what counts as a governmental interest.
Indeed, it often seemed that, according to interest analysis, the
government's only relevant interest was in seeing one of its own citizens
win the particular case at issue."
Such a parochial conception of interests reminds me a bit of Eric
Posner's idea that nation-states pursue interests internationally that
necessarily derive solely from their own domestic systems.' s In Posner's
vision, nation-states simply have interests, and these interests just exist,
totally separate from anything that happens internationally. To me,
governments have a strong interest in being part of an international
system, and even their seemingly domestic interests are inevitably affected
by the fact that they are imbedded in such a system." Indeed, they have a
long-term stake in a reciprocal series of benefits and burdens that will
make the international system work. In a cosmopolitan conception,
therefore, we would focus less on territoriality and more on community
affiliation. And we would take more seriously the broader governmental
interests of states as part of a transnational system.
40From this perspective, the Barcelona.coM case becomes relatively
easy because the case concerns a Spanish individual and a Spanish city
fighting over a Spanish domain name that itself refers to a Spanish city.
The idea that this dispute should be adjudicated under U.S. law because of
where the domain name registry company is or because the Spanish citizen
created a dummy corporation in the United States does not take into
account what is really going on. A U.S. court taking a cosmopolitan
approach, therefore, would need to be restrained and not assume that U.S.
trademark law should apply extraterritorially.
With regard to recognition of judgments, it is important to understand
that for state-to-state transactions in the United States, there is no public
policy exception to the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.41
Therefore, a valid judgment issued by one state must be enforced by every
36. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
37. For a more detailed exposition of this argument, see Berman, supra note 21.
38. See Posner, supra note 10.
39. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2003).
40. 330 F.3d at 628-29.
41. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (making clear that
there is no public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit due judgments).
[Vol. 12:1
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other state. This is true even when the judgment being enforced would be
illegal if issued by the rendering state. 2 Of course, within a single,
relatively homogenous country, the idea of one state enforcing another
state's judgment does not seem quite so significant because the variations
from state to state are likely to be relatively minor. Yet, while the decision
to enforce a judgment surely will be less automatic when the judgment at
issue was rendered by a foreign court, many of the same principles are still
relevant. Most importantly, what we might call the "conflicts values" that
underlie the Full Faith and Credit command should be part of the
judgment recognition calculus. Thus, courts should acknowledge the
importance of participating in an interlocking international legal system,
where litigants cannot simply avoid unpleasant judgments by relocating.
Indeed, in a cosmopolitan world, there is no need for inherent suspicion of
foreign judgments. As in the choice-of-law context, deference to other
courts will have long-term reciprocal benefits. Particularly when the
parties have no significant affiliation with the forum state, there is little
reason for a court to insist on following domestic public policies in the face
of such competing conflicts values.
This is not to say, of course, that foreign judgments should always be
enforced. Indeed, even in a cosmopolitan system, one would expect that
judges might sometimes interpose local public policies where they would
not in the domestic state-to-state setting. However, if we acknowledge the
importance of the conflicts values effectuated by strong judgment
recognition, we will necessarily reject the idea that a court is simply unable
to enforce a judgment because such a judgment could not have been issued
by the court in the first instance. Instead, we will appreciate that enforcing
a foreign judgment is fundamentally different from issuing an original
judgment; indeed, judgment recognition implicates an entirely distinct set
of concerns about the role of courts in a multistate world.
42. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause "ordered submission... even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another
State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the Constitution
designed, demanded it"); see also Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277
(1935) ("In numerous cases this court has held that credit must be given to the judgment of
another state, although the forum would not be required to entertain the suit on which the
judgment was founded"); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (stating that the
judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi even if the
Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law).
2004]
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In most areas of law, U.S. courts have generally invoked these
conflicts values and enforced foreign judgments as a matter of comity.4 1
The Second Restatement codifies this idea, noting that a "judgment
rendered in a foreign nation... will, if valid, usually be given the same
effect as a sister State judgment.' 44  While courts enforcing foreign
judgments (as opposed to domestic ones) have applied a public policy
exception to avoid enforcing particularly egregious rulings,45 the public
policy exception has been construed very narrowly. 6 Accordingly, courts
only refuse to enforce "where the original claim is repugnant to
fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where
enforcement is sought.,
47
In stark contrast to this general policy of respecting foreign
judgments, however, courts in the United States have often refused to
recognize foreign judgments in cases arguably implicating constitutional
concerns, as in the libel case I discussed earlier. Instead, courts generally
have assumed, as the Maryland court did in Telnikoff, that enforcing an
"unconstitutional" judgment is itself a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
As a result, courts have effectively imposed U.S. constitutional norms onto
foreign disputes even in circumstances where the dispute has little
connection with the United States.48
There is no reason, however, to think that the U.S. Constitution is
necessarily implicated in an enforcement action. First, it is debatable
whether the simple enforcement of a judgment creates the requisite state
action to raise a constitutional issue.49 Second, with regard to interstate
43. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 176 (2004) (noting
that, since the nineteenth century, "the United States has been at the vanguard of enforcing
foreign judgments").
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (1971).
45. See The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective in the
U.S. Dec. 29, 1970); see also Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13
U.L.A. 261 (1991) (requiring courts to enforce judgments or arbitral awards unless there is
fraud or if doing so would be repugnant to the public policy of the enforcing forum).
46. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 177-79 (surveying U.S. case law on enforcement of
foreign judgments).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (1971).
48. See Rosen, supra note 43 (providing an insightful critique of this practice).
49. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause precluded a court from enforcing a private, racially restrictive covenant.
In so doing, the Court determined that, although the covenant itself was entered into by
private actors who were not subject to the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
action by the courts in enforcing the covenant was sufficient state action to trigger
constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 14. Shelley, therefore, appears to block judicial
[Vol. 12:1
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harmony, a refusal to enforce the British libel judgment effectively
imposes U.S. First Amendment norms on the United Kingdom. Such
parochialism in judgment recognition, as in choice of law, is cause for
concern. Third, while it is true that constitutional concerns could
conceivably generate sufficient public policy reasons to refuse to enforce a
judgment, the libel dispute in Telnikoff did not in any way implicate U.S.
public policy because neither party had any particular affiliation with the
United States at the time of the events ai issue.
Thus, even if U.S. constitutional values or public policy considerations
might sometimes require a court to refuse to enforce a judgment, there is
no basis for a categorical rule preventing enforcement, and little reason to
refuse to enforce a validly issued foreign judgment absent significant ties
between the dispute and the United States. Instead, courts should take
seriously the conflicts values that would be effectuated by enforcing the
foreign judgment, weigh the importance of such values against the relative
importance of the local public policy or constitutional norm, and then
consider the degree to which the parties have affiliated themselves with the
forum. Only then can courts take into account the multistate nature of the
dispute and the flexible nature of community affiliation in a cosmopolitan
world.
enforcement of a private agreement (or a foreign order) that would be unconstitutional.
Courts, in refusing to enforce foreign "unconstitutional" judgments, have explicitly relied
on Shelley. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antis6mitisme, 169
F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd. on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.
2004). However, since the time Shelley was issued, courts and commentators have backed
away from the sweeping ramifications of Shelley. This is because, under Shelley's
reasoning, any private contract that is being enforced by a police officer or court would be
transformed into state action. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1697 (2d ed., The Foundation Press 1988) (arguing that Shelley's approach, "consistently
applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional
standards whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of
potential judicial enforcement"). Although generations of legal realists and critical legal
studies scholars have articulated similarly sweeping conceptions of state action, see Paul
Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying
Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1279-81 (2000)
(surveying these critiques), courts have largely resisted Shelley and have limited its holding
only to the context of racially restrictive covenants. Indeed, even in cases implicating the
First Amendment, "with virtually no exceptions, courts have concluded that the judicial
enforcement of private agreements inhibiting speech does not trigger constitutional review,
despite the fact that identical legislative limitations on speech would have." See Rosen,
supra note 43, at 192-95 (collecting cases). Thus, it is not clear how robust Shelley still is
and whether it would truly pose a constitutional bar in an action to enforce a foreign
judgment. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 186-209 (discussing Shelley and its implications for
judgment recognition).
2004]
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Finally, I should just take one moment to distinguish the Alien Tort
Claims Act,0 since it has been a much talked about statute during this
conference. At first glance, it might seem that a cosmopolitan approach
would reject the idea that an alien with little connection to the United
States suing another alien with little connection to the United States could
do so under U.S. law. After all, that would seem to be a sort of
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, like the trademark statute in
Barcelona.com" or the antitrust act in Empagran." However, the Alien
Tort Claims Act is different because the statute itself already imports a
cosmopolitan perspective into U.S. law by explicitly referring to the law of
nations. 3 Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this past term,
the international norms to be applied under the Alien Tort Claims Act are
only those major crimes or human rights violations for which there is a
strong transnational consensus.54 Thus, the statute is a reflection of
cosmopolitan deference to global norms, not a parochial imposition of
local ones.
To conclude, it seems to me that those who embrace transnational
legal process should not limit themselves to asking courts to pay more
attention to international law or foreign constitutional norms. In addition,
judges should take seriously their role within a transnational system even
in ordinary domestic law cases having multinational elements. We can
already see signs that judges are embracing a transnationalist vision in
certain areas, such as bankruptcy. Where once courts simply adjudicated
bankruptcies independently, based on the presence of assets in their
territorial jurisdiction, global insolvencies are now often dealt with by
courts working cooperatively."5 It is only through that kind of day-to-day
awareness that we get a true transnational system. Otherwise you get a
segmented system where countries have unlimited power to assert
jurisdiction or apply legal norms to any case with an element arising within
their territorial borders, but where they have no power to apply their
norms to cases (like those involving the military detention centers at
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
51. 330 F.3d 617.
52. 124 S. Ct. 2359.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
54. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,2768-69 (2004).
55. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global
Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991); see also
Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism,
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Guantanamo) that happen to be located outside those borders. In such a
world, control of the domain name system (for example) will depend
almost exclusively on where the .con registry is located. That may be fine
for us right now because it is in the United States," but in the future the
registry could be relocated anywhere in the world. Would we want the
trademark law for the internet to depend on such an arbitrary fact?
Instead, I would argue that domestic judges, thinking of themselves as
cosmopolitan transnational actors, need to (1) consider a broader web of
community affiliations rather than simply resolve conflicts disputes based
solely on territorial contacts; and (2) recognize that they are imbedded in
an international system where they cannot and should not simply assert
parochial interests to the maximum extent they can. Only through such a
vision is transnational legal process possible. Thank you very much.
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